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Abstract
The well known refinement of the Nash Equilibrium (NE) called an Evolutionarily Stable
Strategy (ESS) is investigated in the quantum Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game that is played
using an Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen type setting. Earlier results report that in this scheme the
classical NE remains intact as the unique solution of the quantum PD game. In contrast, we
show here that interestingly in this scheme a non-classical solution for the ESS emerges for
the quantum PD.
Keywords: quantum games, Prisoner’s Dilemma, Nash Equilibrium, EPR-Bohm experiments,
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1 Introduction
In the area of quantum games [1–38], a result from a recent paper [28] shows that, in the quan-
tization scheme based on performing generalized Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen-Bohm (EPR-Bohm)
experiments [39–44], the two-player quantum game of Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) does not offer a
new Nash Equilibrium (NE1) [45,46], which is different from the classical NE of the game in which
both players play the strategy of defection. This quantization scheme constructs the quantum PD
in two steps:
1) The players’ payoff relations are re-expressed in terms of joint probabilities corresponding
to generalized EPR-Bohm experiments involving a bipartite system shared between two players.
In a run each player receives one part of the system while having two observables both of which
are dichotomic. A player’s strategy is defined to be entirely classical that consists of a linear
combination (with real and normalized coefficients) of choosing between his/her two observables.
The scheme embeds the classical game within the quantum game by placing constraints on joint
probabilities. These constraints guarantee that for factorizable joint probabilities the classical
game emerges along with its particular outcome.
2) As a set of joint probabilities that violates Bell’s inequality must always be non-factorizable,
the corresponding quantum game is constructed by retaining the constraints on joint probabilities,
obtained in the last step, while they can now be non-factorizable.
By constructing quantum games from non-factorizable joint probabilities, which a quantum
mechanical apparatus can provide, this quantization scheme avoids state vectors and brings out the
essence of quantum games without referring to quantum mechanics—an important consideration
in developing the present approach to quantum games. Game theory finds applications in a range
of disciplines [47] and we believe that more accessible approaches to quantum games remain in
need of development.
It turns out that in this quantization scheme the constraints on joint probabilities obtained
for the game of PD, which embed the classical game within the quantum game, come out to be
so strong that the subsequent permitting joint probabilities to become non-factorizable cannot
change the outcome of the game. The quantum PD game that is played in this framework,
1In the rest of this paper we use NE to mean Nash Equilibrium or Nash Equilibria. The correct meaning is
judged from the context.
therefore, generates an outcome identical to the one obtained in the classical game in which both
players defect. This finding motivates us in the present paper to investigate if non-factorizable
joint probabilities can bring out some non-classical outcome for a refinement of the NE in the PD
game, while not affecting the NE itself.
In this paper we show that surprisingly this indeed is the case. That is, with an EPR-Bohm
type setting for playing a quantum game a set of non-factorizable joint probabilities is able to
produce a non-classical outcome in the quantum PD game to a well known refinement on the
set of symmetric Nash equilibria—called an Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS) [48–50]. This
contrasts interestingly with the reported result [28] that for the same game, non-factorizable joint
probabilities are unable to produce a non-classical outcome for a NE and the classical NE remains
intact as the unique solution of the quantum PD game.
Using the quantization schemes of Eisert et al. [5] and Marinatto and Weber [11], the game-
theoretic concept of an ESS was originally investigated in the area of quantum games by Iqbal
and Toor in a series of papers [12, 14, 17, 20, 24] and was reviewed by Iqbal and Cheon in a book
chapter [33]. The present paper addresses the issues raised in these publications using the new
approach towards constructing quantum games recently proposed by Iqbal and Cheon [28], which
exploits non-factorizable property of quantum mechanical joint probabilities in the construction
of quantum games.
In a recent paper [36] we have investigated a quantum version of the Matching Pennies game
played in this quantization scheme to find that non-classical NE emerge in this game for sets of
(quantum mechanical) joint probabilities that maximally violate CHSH form of Bell’s inequal-
ity [43]. The present paper considers the PD game in this quantization scheme and explores the
fate of a well known refinement of the NE concept in relation to joint probabilities becoming
non-factorizable.
2 Evolutionarily Stable Strategy
An ESS is the central solution concept of evolutionary game theory [49,50] (EGT). In EGT genes
are considered players in survival games and players’ strategies are the behavioral characteristics
imparted by genes to their host organism, while the payoff to a gene is the number of offspring
carrying that gene [50]. The players’ strategies (which the players genes play until the biologi-
cal agents carrying those genes die) and their payoffs become related as host organisms having
favourable behavioral characteristics are better able to reproduce than others.
Referring to a pool of genes, the notion of an ESS considers a large population of players
(genes) in which players are matched in random pair-wise contests. We call the two players in an
interaction to be player 1 and player 2. Each player can play the strategy S or the strategy S′ in
a pair-wise interaction and the payoff matrix for the game is given as
Player 1
S
S′
Player 2
S S′(
(a1, b1) (a2, b2)
(a3, b3) (a4, b4)
)
, (1)
where the two entries in the bracket are player 1’s and player 2’s strategies, respectively. For
example, player 1’s payoff is Π1(S, S) = a1 when both players play the strategy S. It is found
useful to define
A=
(
a1 a2
a3 a4
)
, B=
(
b1 b2
b3 b4
)
(2)
to be player 1’s and player 2’s payoff matrices, respectively. We write players’ payoffs as Π1,2(x, y)
where subscripts 1 or 2 refer to the players and x and y in bracket are player 1’s and player 2’s
strategies, respectively.
An ESS deals with symmetric games in which
Π1(x, y) = Π2(y, x) and Π1(y, x) = Π2(x, y) (3)
saying that, for example, player 1’s payoff when s/he plays x and player 2 plays y, is same as the
player 2’s payoff when s/he plays y and player 1 plays x, where x and y can be either S or S′.
In words, in a symmetric game a player’s payoff is determined by the strategy, and not by the
identity, of a player.
For a symmetric game using subscripts in payoff relations becomes redundant as Π(x, y) denotes
payoff to an x-player against a y-player. This allows not to refer to players at all and to describe
Π(x, y) as the payoff to x-strategy against the y-strategy. The game given by the matrix (1) is
symmetric when A = BT . The game of PD is a symmetric game, which is defined by the constraint
a3 > a1 > a4 > a2.
Assume that, in random pair-wise contests, the strategy x is played by a number of players
whose relative proportion in the population is ǫ whereas the rest of the population plays the
strategy x⋆. EGT defines the fitnesses [49, 50] of the strategies x and x⋆ as
F (x) = ǫΠ(x, x) + (1− ǫ)Π(x, y), F (x⋆) = ǫΠ(x⋆, x) + (1 − ǫ)Π(x⋆, x⋆), (4)
in terms of which the strategy x⋆ is called an ESS when F (x⋆) > F (x) i.e.
ǫΠ(x⋆, x) + (1− ǫ)Π(x⋆, x⋆) > ǫΠ(x, x) + (1− ǫ)Π(x, x⋆). (5)
Since ǫ ≪ 1, the terms containing ǫ can be ignored effectively. So F (x⋆) > F (x) implies
Π(x⋆, x⋆) > Π(x, x⋆). If, however, Π(x⋆, x⋆) = Π(x, x⋆), we need to consider the terms con-
taining ǫ. In this case, F (x⋆) > F (x) requires that Π(x⋆, x) > Π(x, x). We then define an strategy
x⋆ to be evolutionarily stable iff for all strategies x 6= x⋆ either
1) either Π(x⋆, x⋆)−Π(x, x⋆) > 0 or if
2) Π(x⋆, x⋆) = Π(x, x⋆) then Π(x⋆, x) −Π(x, x) > 0. (6)
This definition shows that an ESS is a symmetric NE [49, 50] satisfying an additional stability
property. The stability property ensures that [50] if an ESS establishes itself in a population, it is
able to withstand pressures of mutation and selection. Using a game-theoretic wording, an ESS is
a refinement on the set of symmetric Nash equilibria and, though being a static solution concept,
it describes dynamic evolutionary situations.
3 ESS in Prisoner’s Dilemma when joint probabilities are
factorizable
We consider game-theoretic solution-concept of an ESS in quantum mechanical regime by observ-
ing that quantum mechanics can make only probabilistic predictions and any setup for a quantum
game must have a probabilistic description. That is, when a quantum game is constructed using
joint probabilities, even the so-called one-shot game must first be translated into some appro-
priate probabilistic version before one considers its quantum version. This translation permits
us, in the following step, to introduce (quantum mechanical) joint probabilities (that may not be
factorizable) and to find if and how such probabilities can change the outcome of the game.
To achieve this in view of the ESS concept, we consider an EPR-Bohm type setting [28]
consisting of a bipartite dichotomic physical system that the two players share to play the game
(1). This system can be described by the following 16 joint probabilities pi with 1 ≤ i ≤ 16:
pi = Pr(π1, π2; a, b) with i = 1 +
(1 − π2)
2
+ 2
(1− π1)
2
+ 4(b− 1) + 8(a− 1), (7)
where π1 is player 1’s outcome, that can have a dichotomic value of +1 or −1, obtained when
s/he plays the strategy S or S′. We associate S ∼ 1 and S′ ∼ 2 that then assigns a value for a.
Similarly, π2 is player 2’s outcome, that can have a dichotomic value of +1 or −1, obtained when
s/he plays the strategy S or S′. The same association S ∼ 1 and S′ ∼ 2 then assigns a value for
b. For example, the joint probability corresponding to the situation when player 1’s outcome π1
is +1 when s/he plays S′ (i.e. a = 2), while player 2’s outcome π2 is −1 when s/he plays S (i.e.
b = 1), is obtained from (7) as p10.
We now define players’ payoff relations when they play the game (1) using this (probabilistic)
physical system to which the 16 joint probabilities (7) correspond,
ΠA,B(x, y) =
(
x
1− x
)T (
ΠA,B(S, S) ΠA,B(S, S
′)
ΠA,B(S
′, S) ΠA,B(S
′, S′)
)(
y
1− y
)
, (8)
where
ΠA,B(S, S) =
∑4
i=1(a, b)ipi, ΠA,B(S, S
′) =
∑8
i=5(a, b)i−4pi,
ΠA,B(S
′, S) =
∑12
i=9(a, b)i−8pi, ΠA,B(S
′, S′) =
∑16
i=13(a, b)i−12pi. (9)
Here T indicates transpose and x and y are the probabilities, definable over a large number of
runs, with which Alice and Bob choose the strategies S and S′, respectively. Joint probabilities
are normalized i.e.
∑4
i=1 pi = 1 =
∑8
i=5 pi,
∑12
i=9 pi = 1 =
∑16
i=13 pi. (10)
A Nash equilibrium strategy pair (x⋆, y⋆) is then obtained from the inequalities:
ΠA(x
⋆, y⋆)−ΠA(x, y
⋆) > 0, ΠB(x
⋆, y⋆)−ΠB(x
⋆, y) > 0, (11)
and a symmetric game, defined by the conditions (3), is obtained when
ΠA(S, S) = ΠB(S, S), ΠA(S, S
′) = ΠB(S
′, S),
ΠA(S
′, S) = ΠB(S, S
′), ΠA(S
′, S′) = ΠB(S
′, S′). (12)
As it is reported in Ref. [28], in case joint probabilities are factorizable one can find r, s, r′, s′ ∈ [0, 1]
such that [28]
p1 = rr
′, p2= r(1 − r
′
),...p8= (1− r)(1 − s
′
),
p9 = sr
′, p10= s(1− r
′
),...p16= (1− s)(1 − s
′
), (13)
and the Nash inequalities (11) are reduced to [28]
(r¸− s¸)TA{y⋆(r¸′ − s¸′)+s¸′} (x⋆ − x) > 0,
{
x⋆(r¸− s¸)T + s¸T
}
B(r¸′−s¸′)(y⋆ − y) > 0, (14)
where r¸=
(
r
1− r
)
, s¸=
(
s
1− s
)
, r¸′ =
(
r′
1− r′
)
, s¸′ =
(
s′
1− s′
)
.
When joint probabilities are factorizable, the conditions (12) to obtain a symmetric game can
be shown to reduce to A = BT and the payoff relations (8) are then simplified to
Π(x, y) =
(
x
1− x
)T (
Π(S, S) Π(S, S′)
Π(S′, S) Π(S′, S′)
)(
y
1− y
)
, (15)
where
Π(S, S) = r¸TMr¸′, Π(S, S′) = r¸TMs¸′,
Π(S′, S) = s¸TMr¸′, Π(S′, S′) = s¸TMs¸′, (16)
and M = A = BT . The second inequality in (11) is ΠB(x
⋆, y⋆) − ΠB(x
⋆, y) ≥ 0 that becomes
ΠA(y
⋆, x⋆)−ΠA(y, x
⋆) ≥ 0 for a symmetric game. Comparing it to the first inequality in (11) gives
x⋆ = y⋆ and x = y and the definition of a symmetric NE is reduced simply to Π(x⋆, x⋆)−Π(x, x⋆) >
0.
Evaluating the two parts of the ESS definition (6) from a symmetric game payoff relations (15)
we find
Π(x⋆, x⋆)−Π(x, x⋆) = (x⋆ − x)(x⋆∆1 +∆2), Π(x
⋆, x)−Π(x, x) = (x⋆ − x)(x∆1 +∆2) (17)
where ∆1 = (Π(S, S) − Π(S
′, S) − Π(S, S′) + Π(S′, S′) and ∆2 = Π(S, S
′) − Π(S′, S′). Now ∆1
and ∆2 are evaluated using (16) as
∆1 = (r − s)(r
′ − s′)Ω1 and ∆2 = (r − s)(s
′Ω1 − Ω2), (18)
where Ω1 = a1 − a2 − a3 + a4 and Ω2 = a4 − a2. Recall that PD is defined by the constraints
a3 > a1 > a4 > a2 and we have Ω2 > 0, which asks for a natural association of the strategy of
defection in PD to the strategy x⋆ = 0 played in the present setting. When both players play this
strategy we obtain from the Eq. (15) Π(0, 0) = Π(S′, S′), which is the payoff to each player in
the classical game when they both defect. With this association Eqs. (17) give Π(0, 0)−Π(x, 0) =
−x∆2 and Π(0, x) −Π(x, x) = −x(x∆1 +∆2), which correspond to the first and second parts of
the ESS definition (6), respectively. For this strategy if we take
s′ = Ω2/Ω1, r − s = r
′ − s′ (19)
then the two parts of the ESS definition are reduced to
Π(0, 0)−Π(x, 0) = 0, Π(0, x) −Π(x, x) = −x2(r − s)2Ω1. (20)
As Ω1 = Ω2 − Ω3, where Ω3 = (a3 − a1), for PD both Ω2,Ω3 > 0. As Ω2 > 0 and s
′ = Ω2/Ω1
is a probability we require the constraint 1 > Ω2/Ω1 > 0 so Ω1 > Ω2 > 0, from which one obtains
Ω2 > Ω3 i.e.
a4 − a2 > a3 − a1 (21)
along with this, of course, we also have a3 > a1 > a4 > a2. The extra requirement (21) defines a
subset of the games that are put under the name of a generalized PD. For this game the result (20)
states that the strategy x⋆ = 0 is not an ESS, though it is a symmetric NE, when joint probabilities
are factorizable, in the sense described by (13), and have the constraints (19) imposed on them.
4 Obtaining the quantum game
There can be several different possible routes in obtaining a quantum game. The general idea is
to establish correspondence, as a first step, between classical feature of a physical system and a
classical game in the sense that classical game results because of those features. In the following
step, the classical feature are replaced by quantum feature, while the obtained correspondence
in the first step is retained. One then looks at the impact which the quantum feature has on
the solution/outcome of the game under consideration. As the mentioned correspondence can be
established in several possible ways, there can be many different routes in obtaining a quantum
game.
To consider ESS in quantum PD we translate playing of this game in terms of factorizable
joint probabilities, which is achieved in the previous Section. We then find constraints on these
probabilities ensuring that the classical game remains embedded within the quantum game, which
is achieved by Eq. (19). For factorizable joint probabilities the Eqs. (13) hold that permit us
to translate the constraints (19) in terms of joint probabilities. In the following step, the joint
probabilities are allowed to be non-factorizable, while they continue to be restricted by the obtained
constraints.
Joint probabilities pi become non-factorizable when one cannot find r, s, r
′, s′ ∈ [0, 1] such that
pi can be expressed in terms of them i.e. as given in (13). The same payoff relations (8), therefore,
correspond to the qunatum game, whose parts are given by (9), and players’ strategies remain
exactly the same.
We require that the constraints (19), when they are re-expressed using (13) in terms of joint
probabilities pi, remain valid while pi are allowed to be non-factorizable. We notice that Eqs. (13)
allow re-expressing the constraints (19) in terms of pi as
r = p1 + p2, r
′ = p1 + p3, s = p9 + p10, s
′ = p5 + p7, (22)
and the constraints (19) take the form
p5 + p7 = Ω2/Ω1, p1 + p2 − p9 − p10 = p1 + p3 − p5 − p7. (23)
At this stage we refer to the analysis of joint probabilities in generalized EPR-Bohm experi-
ments by Cereceda [44] reporting that eight out of sixteen joint probabilities can be eliminated
using the normalization constraints (10) and the causal communication constraints given as fol-
lows,
p1+p2= p5+p6, p1+p3= p9+p11, p9+p10= p13+p14, p5+p7= p13+p15,
p3+p4= p7+p8, p11+p12= p15+p16, p2+p4= p10+p12, p6+p8= p14+p16.
(24)
The constraints (10, 24), of course, do hold for factorizable joint probabilities that are given by
Eqs. (13). Cereceda expresses probabilities p2, p3, p6, p7, p10, p11, p13, p16 in terms of probabilities
p1, p4, p5, p8, p9, p12, p14, p15 as
p2= (1− p1−p4+p5−p8−p9+p12+p14−p15)/2, p3= (1 − p1−p4−p5+p8+p9−p12−p14+p15)/2,
p6= (1 + p1−p4−p5−p8−p9+p12+p14−p15)/2, p7= (1 − p1+p4−p5−p8+p9−p12−p14+p15)/2,
p10= (1− p1+p4+p5−p8−p9−p12+p14−p15)/2, p11= (1 + p1−p4−p5+p8−p9−p12−p14+p15)/2,
p13= (1− p1+p4+p5−p8+p9−p12−p14−p15)/2, p16= (1 + p1−p4−p5+p8−p9+p12−p14−p15)/2,
(25)
and the payoff relations (8) now involve only eight ‘independent’ probabilities.
5 ESS in quantum Prisoner’s Dilemma
For the strategy of defection (x⋆ = 0) in the quantum game with payoff relations (8), the ESS
definition (6) and Eqs. (17) give
Π(0, 0)−Π(x, 0) = x {Π(S′, S′)−Π(S, S′)} , (26)
which is equated to zero so that the strategy x⋆ = 0 remains a symmetric NE in the quantum
game, as it is the case in the game when joint probabilities are factorizable, and which is described
by Eqs. (20). With setting Π(S′, S′) = Π(S, S′) the second part of the ESS definition (6), which
is evaluated in (17), reduces itself to
Π(0, x)−Π(x, x) = x2 {Π(S′, S)−Π(S, S)} . (27)
With Cereceda’s analysis and using Eqs. (25), setting Π(S, S′)−Π(S′, S′) = 0 results in
p1+p5+p8+p12+p14+p15= 1+ p4+p9, p4+p5+p8+p9+p14+p15= 1 + p1+p12, (28)
and under the constraints (28) the strategy x⋆ = 0 then remains a symmetric NE even for non-
factorizable joint probabilities. Also, using Eqs. (25) the constraints (23) can be re-expressed in
term of ‘independent probabilities’ as
(1− p1 + p4 + p5 − p8 + p9 − p12 − p14 + p15) = Ω2/Ω1, p5 + p12 = p8 + p9, (29)
which allows us to arbitrarily eliminate probabilities p1 and p12 from the constraints (28) to
re-express them as
p5 + p15 = Ω2/Ω1, p8 + p14 = 1− Ω2/Ω1. (30)
Using Eqs. (25), while considering the strategy x⋆ = 0 for the second part of the ESS definition
the Eq. (27) becomes
Π(0, x) −Π(x, x) = x2 {Ω3(p1 − p9) + Ω2(p12 − p4)} , (31)
which simplifies further when we eliminate p1 and p12 using (29) and afterwards eliminate p14 and
p15 using (28) to obtain
Π(0, x)−Π(x, x) = x2(p8 + p9 − p4 − p5)Ω1. (32)
As Ω1 > 0, the strategy x
⋆ = 0 thus becomes an ESS if
p8 + p9 > p4 + p5, (33)
and when joint probabilities pi satisfy constraints (29, 28), along with the constraints given by
normalization and causal communication.
6 Discussion
The game-theoretic solution concept of an ESS is investigated within a quantization scheme that
constructs quantum games from the non-factorizable property of quantum mechanical joint prob-
abilities. Neither entanglement nor violation of Bell’s inequality [41, 43] is used explicitly in this
construction [53].
Eq. (32) shows that probabilities p4, p5, p8, p9 can be taken to be ‘independent’ as, out of the
remaining four probabilities, the probabilities p14 and p15 are obtained from (30) and probabilities
p1 and p12 are obtained from (29). The remaining eight probabilities p2, p3, p6, p7, p10, p11, p13,
p16 are then obtained from (25). The scheme used to obtain a quantum game assumes that
a set of non-factorizable joint probabilities, which satisfies normalization (10) and the causal
communication constraint (24) can always be generated by some bipartite quantum state (pure or
mixed) provided that the set does not violate CHSH form of Bell’s inequality beyond Cirel’son’s
limit [54].
A natural question here is to ask if Bell’s inequality is violated by requiring p8 + p9 > p4 + p5,
which makes the strategy of defection (x⋆ = 0) an ESS. To answer this we consider probabilistic
form [44] of CHSH version of Bell’s inequality [43] expressed as −2 ≤ ∆ ≤ 2 where ∆ = 2(p1 +
p4 + p5 + p8 + p9 + p12 + p14 + p15 − 2). We insert values for p1, p12, p14, p15 using (29, 30) to
obtain
∆ = 2(2p4 + p9 − 1). (34)
Now, comparing (34) to (33) shows that the violation of the CHSH inequality is not essential
for the strategy of defection to be an ESS for a set of non-factorizable probabilities, when for a
factorizable set of probabilities this strategy is non-ESS and a symmetric NE only.
To summarize, a non-classical solution for an ESS in the quantum PD game has been shown
to emerge due to joint probabilities that are non-factorizable. An ESS offers a stronger solution
concept than a NE and we consider the situation in which the same NE, consisting of the strategy
of defection on behalf of both players, continues to exist in both the classical and the quantum
versions of the PD game, which correspond to situations of joint probabilities being factorizable
and non-factorizable, respectively. It is shown that non-factorizable quantum joint probabilities
can bring evolutionary stability to the strategy of defection via the 2nd part of the ESS definition
(6).
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